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With a large-scale econometric world model we derive policy multipliers and the 
parameters for the utility functions for 10 EMU countries and for the ECB. The gains 
from cooperation are calculated by comparing two equilibria, a Nash and a 
cooperative equilibrium. The cooperative equilibrium is the result of the 
maximization of a weighted utility function for Euroland as a whole with the targets 
output gap and inflation. In the case of a “full" cooperation, where the 10 EMU 
countries coordinate their fiscal policy with the monetary policy of the ECB the 
welfare gains are very large for the whole Euro zone. However the strong fiscal and 
monetary policy impulses as a result of this optimization procedure lead, firstly, to a 
violation of the fiscal targets (budget deficit, public debt) of the Stability and Growth 
Pact which limits the room for manoeuvre of fiscal policy of the EMU member states 
in stage III of EMU. Secondly, we find that not in all countries cooperation leads to 
welfare gains, a result which is not Pareto efficient. Therefore, by considering these 
two constraints (Pareto optimality and SGP objectives) the constrained optimization 
results in a solution in case of “full” cooperation which drives most countries back to 
the Nash position of the baseline. In addition, a “partial” cooperation in which the 
ECB stays aside and only the fiscal policies of the EMU member countries are taking 
part, leads to a very small welfare improvement and violates again (only to minor 
degree the Pareto optimality condition). The optimal fiscal policy impulses are very 
modest.
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The new policy regime of EMU justifies to raise the old question whether policy 
coordination makes countries better off. On the one hand the Maastricht Treaty 
demands economic policy coordination in Article 991. On the other hand the 
division of responsibility of economic policy making in EMU is unique. An 
independent European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for the monetary 
policy for Euroland, whereas the EMU member countries still are the indivuda! 
actors of the fiscal policy. However, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) limits 
fiscal expansion. These specific rules of the policy game imply different 
combinations for possible cooperations: either the EMU member countries 
cooperate in pursuing their fiscal policy and/or they cooperate with each other 
and with the ECB. The primary target for the ECB is to maintain price stability. 
Presently the most urgent target for the EMU member countries is full 
employment. However, reading the Articles of the TEC concerning coordination 
and those of the SGP (in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 
July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and “coordination” of economic policies) one gets the impression 
that coordination in the EMU primarily has a negative or passive connotation 
(medium-term objective of “sound budgetary positions close to balance or in 
surplus”). Normally, economic policy coordination aims at improving the 
economic position of a group of countries (positive or active connotation).
Several authors have already dealt with economic policy cooperation in 
EMU. However, most of them either used theoretically calibrated models 
(Krichel-Levine-Pearlman, 1996) or heavily stylized models (Hughes-Hallet, 
1998). In each case two countries are combined with one ECB. Huizinga- 
Nielsen (1998) ask whether policy coordination of fiscal deficits is necessary at 
all and under which theoretical conditions it may make sense. Kamer (1999) 
analyses within a game-theoretic model with three countries and one ECB the 
outcome of the maximization of intertemporal utilities of countries and of the 
ECB (the latter also maximizes the levels of debt of the EMU countries?). Van 
Aarle-Engwerda-Plasmans-Weeren (1999) calibrate a two-country EMU with 
one ECB in the style of a New Keynesian disequilibrium model with 
unemployment. Rolf (1996) analyses game-theoretically the different aspects of 
cooperation within a fiscal solidarity union (“fiscal federalism”) in the EMU. 
Non-cooperation would lead to higher optimal debts. Levine (1997) studies 
theoretically the possible interactions of EMU-”ins” and “outs and the 
consequences of the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central 
bank. The empirical evidence on international economic policy coordination is 
generally neither overwhelmingly positive, nor are the gains very high (see for a
1 In this paper we already refer to the new Articles of the Treaty establishing the European 



























































































recent survey Mooslechner-Schiirz (1999). McKibbm (1997) in his review 
mentions gains from 0.5 to 1 percent of GDP at most.
We deal with the possible outcome of coordinating economic policy in the 
EMU. This means on the one hand full coordination of fiscal and monetary 
policy between the EMU member states and the ECB and on the other hand only 
fiscal policy coordination among the EMU member states. The special problem 
of the policy interaction of the “ins” of EMU and the “pre-ins” is not addressed 
here. In order to derive welfare gains from policy cooperation in EMU, we apply 
a large-scale econometric model (Oxford Economic Forecasting -  OEF -  World 
model). This allows us to quantify welfare gains with real-world data and leads 
therefore to realistic policy conclusions. In doing so, we follow the classic 
approach by Oudiz-Sachs (1984). They did this exercise with two world models 
for three countries (USA, Japan and Germany). We do it with one world model 
for the specific policy constellation of EMU (11 countries plus the ECB).
After describing the framework of economic policy in EMU (chapter 1) 
we present evidence on policy multipliefs of fiscal and monetary policy in EMU 
member countries. This gives an idea of the economic interdependencies in 
EMU (chapter 2). In chapter 3 we describe the strategy to measure welfare gains 
from cooperation. With the help of the large-scale econometric world model the 
concrete welfare gains of cooperation are derived under different scenarios: full 
cooperation (EMU countries plus ECB) and only cooperation among the EMU 
countries.
1. THE NEW POLICY REPONSIBILITY IN EMU AND RULES OF 
COOPERATION2
Compared to the benchmark country USA one has the impression that the 
European Union seems to have planned to create an EMU with an asymmetric 
economic policy framework. Whereas in the USA both, monetary and fiscal 
policy are centralised and they dispose of an inter-state transfer mechanism 
(fiscal federalism) which seems to be appropriate to cushion asymmetric or 
idiosyncratic shocks, the coming EMU is build upon an asymmetric architecture 
concerning economic policy.
According to the ideal architecture of economic policy laid down in the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) the EMU framework 
combines a centralised monetary policy (under the responsibility of the ECB) 
with decentralised fiscal or budgetary policies (under the responsibility of




























































































national governments, subject to Community rules on budgetary discipline, as 
the Stability and Growth Pact) and decentralised structural policies and wage 
setting (see Table 1).
This ideal Euro world implies a simple and clear assignment of policies: 
the single monetary policy would, given the primary objective of preserving 
price stability, be able to provide a common response to aggregate economic 
development (see European Commission, 1997B), whereas decentralised 
budgetary policies and other national economic policy instruments would be 
available for responding to country-specific circumstances (or shocks).
After the Decision of the Council of the European Union, meeting in the 
composition of Heads of States or Government of May 3, 1998, the EMU started 
on January 1, 1999 with eleven countries. Based on Article 99(2) of the TEC the 
European Commission (1998, p. 4) has put forward "Broad Guidelines of the 
Economic Policies of the Member States and the Community" for the "ins" and 
the "pre-ins" of the EMU, which were confirmed by the Council 
Recommendation 98/454/EC of 6 July 1998. In its "growth and stability- 
oriented macroeconomic policy mix" scenario the Commission stresses that the 
overall macroeconomic policy mix at the euro-zone level (for the "ins") will 
result from the interaction of the common monetary policy on the one hand and 
with the average budgetary development and wage trends in the participating 
countries, on the other. According to this script for an ideal economic world in 
Euroland of 11 EU Member States, in the framework of the Treaty, 
supplemented by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Amsterdam European 
Council resolution on Growth and Employment’, the responsibilities are 
allocated as follows:
• The single monetary policy in the euro-area will be under the responsibility 
of the independent ECB and ESCB. In conformity with Article 105(1), the 
primary objective of monetary policy will be to maintain price stability and, 
subject thereto, to support the economic objectives of the Union, including, 
in particular, sustained, non-inflationary, growth and high level of 
employment, as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty.
• Budgetary policy will remain in the responsibility of national governments 
but will be subject to the rules of the Treaty (Article 101 to 104) and the 
Stability and Growth Pact, which emphasises the need to have a budgetary 
position close to balance or in surplus in normal economic conditions and 
clarifies the key Treaty provisions on budgetary policy. National 
governments will have to coordinate their budgetary policies in the 




























































































Table 1: The Framework of Economic Policy in EMU with “Ins" and “Pre-ins"
M onetary Policy I Fiscal (B udgetary) Policy | Incom es and  W age Policy
11 Euto- “ins"
Centralised
(ESCB and ECB are 
responsible)
Art. 105 and Protocol 18, Art. 
2: ESCB and ECB: Primary 
objective: price stability, 
support of the general 
economic policies with a view 
of the objectives of the 
Community (Art. 2)
Decentralised
(governments of the Member 
States are responsible)
restricted by the 
Stability and Growth Pact: 
Deficit < 3% of GDP 
(clarification of the excessive 
deficit procedure of Art. 104 
in Reg. (EC) 1467/97);
no Fiscal Federalism in the 
EU
no bail-out (Art. 103(1))
(and declaration by the 




policies as a matter of 
common concern”:
Art. 99)
Multilateral surveillance (Art. 
99(3) and (4) and Reg. (EC) 
1466/97): Stability 
programmes before March 1, 
1999, thereafter annually
Decentralised
(Social Partners in the 
Member States are 
responsible)
Resolution of the European 
Council on growth and 
employment 97/C 236/02) 
and the Commission's 
Recommendation for Broad 
Guidelines of the Economic 
Policies of the Member Stales 
and the Community 
(11/144/98, 13.5.98) suggest a 
"productivity oriented wage 
policy" which is enough 
"flexible" to make the labour 
markets more efficient 
(Mundell's precondition for 




(National central banks - NCB - 
are responsible)
new exchange-rate mechanism 
in stage III of EMU - ERM2 
("hub and spokes" model): Euro 
is the anchor - standard 
fluctuation band 
+/-15% against the Euro 
(participation in ERM2 is 
voluntary: Resolution of the 
European Council 97/C 236/03)
Decentralised
(Member States are responsible) 
obligation to avoid excessive 
deficits (Art. 104 and Art.
116(4); each EU member is 
obliged to a stability oriented 
economic policy and to 
economic policy coordination 
(“economic policies as a matter 
of common concern": Art. 99)
Multilateral surveillance (Art. 
99(3) and (4) and Reg. (EC) 
1466/97): Convergence 
programmes before March 1, 
1999, thereafter annually.
Decentralised
(Social Partners in the Member 
States are responsible)




























































































• Wage setting will remain in the responsibility of the social partners at the 
national, regional, sectoral or even at a more decentralised level following 
their respective traditions. As underlined in the Amsterdam Resolution on 
"Growth and employment" (971C 236/02), the social partners are responsible 
for reconciling high employment with appropriate wage settlements and for 
setting up a suitable framework for the wage formation process. Since they 
have an important bearing on the overall macroeconomic policy mix, 
aggregate wage developments are of general interest." (European 
Commission, 1998, p. 4).
For the countries not participating initially in the euro-zone (the "pre-ins") 
the European Commission (1998. p. 5) stresses that "the need for stability- 
oriented and convergent macroeconomic policies will be equally strong, 
especially if they participate in the ERM2, as countries with a derogation are 
expected to. The strong economic and monetary interdependence between the 
euro-area countries and the Member States not as yet adopting the euro and the 
need to ensure further convergence and a smooth functioning of the single 
market, will require that all Member States are included in the co-ordination of 
economic policies."
The EU in general and the EMU in particular bases its procedure o f policy 
coordination on a set of principles (layed down in the Treaty and in the SGP): 
monitoring and controlling which results in a rolling agenda establishing an 
annual cycle for the “mainstream” coordination process (see Italianer, 1999, p. 
20). There are several forms of coordination: (a) procedural framework 
(participation in the Council (Ecofin) of 15 Member States, the Commission and 
the president of the ECB); Euro-11 group only on the “ins” of EMU, formality, 
assistance, decision rules), (b) exchange of information (indicators, definitions), 
(c) common analytical framework (models, policy impact, forecasts), (d) 
monitoring (performance, policy intentions, early warning, multilateral 
surveillance), (e) take account of policy interactions with others (expression of 
preferences) and (f) joint determination of policies (regularly, discretionary; see 
Italianer, 1999, p. 5).
The provisions concerning economic policy coordination are ruled in the 
TEC in general and in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)3 for stage three of
3 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) consists of two Council Regulations and two 
Resolutions of the European Council Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on 
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 02/08/1997 p. 1); Council Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 02/08/1997, pp. 6-11); Resolution of the European Council on 




























































































the EMU in particular. Article 99(1) says that the “Member States shall regard 
their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate 
them within the Council “The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority 
on a recommendation from the Commission, formualte a draft for the broad 
guidelines of the eocnomic policies of the Member States and the Community, 
and shall report its finding to the European Council” (Article 99(2)). Article 
99(3) rules the monitoring procedure for closer cooperation of economic policies 
and sustained convergence of the economic performance of the Member States 
with a system of multilateral surveillance. The SGP (Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1466/97) then sets out the rules covering the content, the submission, the 
examination and the monitoring of stability programmes (for the “ins” of EMU) 
and the convergence programmes (for the “pre-ins” of EMU) -  to be submitted 
to the Commission annually for a medium-term period of three years -  “as part 
of the multilateral surveillance by the Council so as to prevent, at an early stage, 
the occurrence of excessive general deficits and to promote the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies”.
The scope o f coordination in EMU -  according to halianer (1999, p. 10) - 
can comprise monetary policy, fiscal or budgetary policy, exchange rate policy, 
labour markets (wage setting, structural aspects, active policies), tax policies, 
social security systems, product markets (goods, services), capital marktes. We 
restrict our analysis to the two major policy insruments, namely monetary and 
fiscal policy.
The next question concerns the levels o f coordination in EMU. halianer 
(1999, p. 13-15) identifies three EU levels for coordination: (1) The highest 
coordination level in the EU is that of the Heads of State and Government, in 
particular through the European Council (of which the president of the European 
Commission is also a member) that meets in presence of Ecofin Ministers when 
issues of relevance to EMU are discussed. (2) At the Ministerial level, the main 
co-ordinating bodies are the Council and the Euro-11 group. For matters related 
to EMU and taxation, the most relevant Council formation is that of Economic 
and Finance Ministers (Ecofin), while for employment policies the 
Employment/Social Affairs Council takes the lead. The ECB president is invited 
to the Ecofin and also to the more informal Euro-11 group. In the latter national 
delegations are restricted to two persons (the Minister plus the relevant member 
of the Economic and Financial Committee). The European Commission is 
present both at the Council (Ecofin) and the Euro-11 meetings. The social 
partners are involved in the coordination process at Ministerial level through the 
participation of the main European employers1 and employees1 organisations in 
the so-called European Social Dialogue. (3) The Senior officials level consists of
Resolution of the European Council on growth and employment. Amsterdam, 16 June 1997 




























































































several committees. In the EMU area, the most important is the Economic and 
Financial Committee (since January 1. 1999 the sucessor of the Monetary 
Committee, according to Article 114(2) TEC), which has advisory and 
preparatory functions in preparing the Council meetings. It is composed of two 
representatives of each EMU member state (one from the administration -  
finance ministry, one from the national central bank) and two Commission and 
ECB representatives each. So it is a body for informal dialogue between 
officials from the economic and moneatry poles. In addition there are other 
committees for different purposes (the Economic Policy Committee, the 
Employment Committee, the Banking Advisory Committe. the Banking 
Supervision Committee, the Code of Conduct Group business taxation, the 
Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics).
The Treaty and the SGP always speak of economic policy “coordination". 
This is the more rigorous form of economic cooperation, involving a 
complicated procedure of mutually agreed guidelines and commitments how to 
conduct monetary and fiscal policies, as layed down in the Treaty. A narrower 
form of interaction, often used in game theory, is the notion of economic 
“cooperation” in contrast to non-cooperation. In a game-theory context this 
latter notion is more adequate, also it does not cover the more complicated form 
of coordination as those of the EMU4. Athough we aim at studying the 
implications of different scenarios of cooperation in EMU, technically speaking 
we have to restrict our calculations to the more narrow form of economic policy 
cooperation.
2. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCIES IN EMU
The first way to evaluate the macroeconomic interdependencies is to study the 
evidence on policy multipliers. For this purpose we apply a large-scale world 
macromodel (OEF, 1999). It encompasses 10 EMU countries (only Luxembourg 
is left out), as well as the major OECD countries. For the purpose of studying 
policy multipliers we only look at interdependencies within the EMU area. The 
simulation horizon is 1999-2001. Euroland is already modeled insofar as the 10 
EU countries participating in the EMU have fixed bilateral exchange rates 
starting with 1Q 1999 according to the conversion rates fixed on December 31, 
1998. In addition, the ECB is emulated by assuming the same short-interest rate 
levels in Euroland. And the Euro is already anticipated and calculated against 
third country currencies, like the US-Dollar (USD) or the British Pound (GBP). 
So when simulating shocks one already anticipates the monetary behaviour of 
the European Central Bank (ECB). Its monetary policy reaction function follows
4 For a survey of the different definitions of coordination and cooperation in the literature, see 




























































































something like a Taylor rule: the short-term interest rate adjusts in response both 
to the gap between a target for the stock of money and its actual value and to the 
gap between potential output and actual output.
We compare a fiscal policy stimulus with a monetary policy expansion. 
Fiscal policy expansion is measured by an increase of real goverment spending 
of one percent of GDP. executed individually by each of the 10 EMU member 
countries (Luxemburg excluded). Monetary expansion (done for the whole EMU 
area by the ECB) is measured by a one percentage-point decrease of short-term 
interest rate (uniform in all EMU countries).
As expected from a Mundell-Fleming type world macro model the own 
policy multipliers after a fiscal shock are large compared to the spill-overs to 
partner countries. The latter are mostly positive in sign. The two-years short­
term GDP multipliers range from 0.3 (in Belgium) to 1.0 (in Italy). Inflation 
goes up, unemployment decreases (see Table 2). The budget deficit increases, as 
well as public debt. The current account deteriorates (see Table 3). Monetary 
policy (done centrally by the ECB for the whole EMU area) has a positive 
impact on real GDP and inflation, and reduces unemployment (see Table 2). 
However, the impact on budget deficit and public debt is positive. The results as 
far as the current account is concerned are mixed (see Table 3). As in the 
theoretical Mundell-Fleming model, fiscal policy expansion leads to an 
appreciation of the Euro agains the US-Dollar. Accordingly, the monetary 
expansion results in a depreciation of the Euro (see Table 3).
The fact that the size of the fiscal policy multipliers varies within the 
EMU from country to country is of course the consequence of a still not fully 
harmonized economic performance of the EMU members. Neither is the 
business cycle of all EMU members synchronized, nor are the responses of the 
economies similar to identical policy shocks. Differences in policy multipliers 
may also add to the catalogue of conditions which identify an optimum currency 
area (OCA). In addition to labour market flexibility (Mundell’s criterium), a 
similar impact of policy impulses in a group of countries indicates that these 
countries would belong to an OCA rather than countries which react differently. 
But even within the so-called DM core, consisting of countries whose currencies 
more or less moved alongside the DM in the last decade, namely Austria, 
Belgium. France, the Netherlands and of course Germany, policy responses are 








































































































































!  î  i  1
1 1 c  “
■= « g !<J
II u c
c ."  2 • 'E u  E
■n P C  E
oc w 












W || T3n ^




CL on C «0 C ni
g E3
2  £  »
V5
C3 O ' O On flJ On
aj coc c/o
1 |-o E





i >; o: "O u c■a o
,S S 
a ^
Ù ^  oo
P3 7 3
C £


















































































































































































C l  l-n
3 %
5 EP o
a o5  &




























































































































































































































































































































































































o CO o COLO o CO lO CNJ CO en
</>
D
o LO o- o TT y— o o o T—.
HI o o o o o o o o o' o" CNJ
CVJ o CNJ o M- y— CO "ÔT
12 o o o o o o o o oO o o o o o o o o ' o 9 o
o CO CNJ O" o CO y— o CNJ m
o o o o o o o o o in LO
o o o o o o o o ' o" o o
TJ o CO y—CNJ o y- o o (O LO
c er o o o o o o o o o 00 CNJ<o 2
C U- TJ o o o o o o o o~ o ' o o '
LL
V - to O) T- o CNJ y—~<D r - 00
n o o T— o o o o o y—
o o o o o o o o o ' o"1 o ' o
O’ LO CT) LO h- CNJ CO 00
o CMo o o CNJ o o T - o in
o o o o o o o o ' 9 o T7
_ CNJ o y—O) o h- M- CNJ o> T— CNJ
o CNJ o o o T—o o in o 00
i t ■ o
o o o o o o o o o o CD
OCL
LO CNJ o- o CNJ o T- • t
A o y— o o o o o LO o o CNJ
o o1 o o o o o o ? o ' o" o
y—co y—CO o y—CNJ o o CO
o T—o o o o o N o o CO
o o o o o o o o” o ' o ' o
ro o co T- CO o OJ T- o o o
h_ _ CJ o o o o o o o o o CNJ
w <  3  ^  
<
TJ o o o o o o o T“1 o‘ o o
CMCO CNJ LO o T- ~ y— LO
n o y— o o o o CO o o o o
o o o o o o o o1 o ' o ' o" o
CO CO y-. in y_ y_ o 00
o y— o o o o o o o N-
o o o o o o 9 o o o" o
</> r-. y- o CNJ (O o y—o coT3 o o o o o o CNJ o o o
l ï0) Z TJ
o o o o o o 9 o o ' o o
o
z
y—CNJ o 00 y- o~"ô ~c5~
.£2 o o o o o CO o o o o y—
o o o o o o 9 o o ' o ' o ' o
o CO CNJ CNJ o O) IO o y— y__
o o o o o 00 o o o o CNJ
o o o o o 9 o o o o '
T - CO CO COo CNJ CNJ T - o T - O)
o T— o o o O) o o o o CO
2  ^ TJ o o o o o o’1 o o o ' o o '
, — _ , —v _ _ ,_ „__
b
































































































































































































3. COORDINATION OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY IN EMC
In following Oudiz-Sachs (1984), our strategy for measuring the gains from 
coordination is to compare two equilibria: one in which each country plus the 
ECB pursues optimal policies taking as given the action of the others 
(“noncooperative” or “Nash” equilibrium; in our empirical example the baseline 
is identified as the “Nash” equilibrium), and one in which the authorities 
“bargain" over a coordinated package of policies (“bargaining” or “cooperative" 
equilibrium).
3.1 A Model for the Nash Equilibrium
For the empirical evaluation of the gains from cooperation we use the classic 
Tinbergen targets- and-instruments framework (see Oudiz-Sachs, 1984, pp. 59 
ff.). We consider a static model, where the economy is represented by a set of 
multipliers. These multipliers link various “targets” of each country to policy 
instruments. The multipliers are taken from the OEF world model for the period 
1999-2001.
The strategy is as follows: In a n -country world T' =  (7 )',.....T'„) is the
vector of country i ‘s targets. The baseline or “central variant” projection of T‘, 
T"‘ is taken from a simulation of the OEF world model. The policy controls for
country i are the elements of vector C' = (C ,'......C ) .  The authorities in country i
maximize a welfare function U'(T‘).
The matrix rcontaines the multipliers linking the overall vector of controls 
C = (C ‘, C \ ......C") to the overall vector of targets T = (T',T2,.....T"), so that
T = CT + T b . (1)
When C = 0 then T = TB, the baseline corresponds to the situation where 
no additional policy actions are taken.
Next we assume that the baseline is a Nash equilibrium for the 
n countries. The optimal policy for each country i, given the actions of the 
others, is C' -  0 and consequently T‘ = TB' . This assumption allows us to identify 
the key parameters of each country’s utility function. Finally we find the 
cooperative equilibrium as the solution to a bargaining problem. A common 





























































































We adopt this framework to model the EMU. In the monetary union 
policy instruments are split between the ECB who is in charge of monetary 
policy for the union as a whole and the EMU member countries who control 
their own fiscal policy.
We consider n = 10 EMU countries, who’s targets T‘ are the value of the 
output gap ( q;) and inflation as a deviation from target (tt‘) over the years 1999 
to 2001. Their only policy instrument is fiscal policy. Fiscal policy is measured 
by an increase in real government spending of one percent of real GDP 
sustained over the period 1999 to 2001. We write this as
T‘ = (Ql999<Q2000’Q200\’,r'l999’,r2000'7r2000' ....*0 (2)
C‘ =G‘ (3)
The ECB is modelled in our empirical analysis as a synthetic 1 l <h EMU 
“country”. This means that the targets of the ECB are the GDP-weighted 
averages of those of the 10 EMU countries. Monetary policy is pursued 
centralized by the ECB
t e c b
c e c b
, n ECB r\ECB r,ECB „EC B  _ ECB „E C B  . 




The target variables are GDP-weighted sums of the same variables of the 
10 EMU member countries: QECB = Z}2ig,2' and ttECB =Y}^gin‘ with 
gj =GDP weights.
Monetary policy is measured by a one percentage-point decrease of the 
short-term interest rate uniform in all countries, sustained over three years.
3.2 Derivation of the Utility Function Parameters
The assumption that the baseline is a Nash equilibrium gives us a first
dU loder condition on the utility function for every country: -—- = 0 and for the
dG1
dUECBECB: ---- = 0. The derivatives can be calculated by
dMECB
du‘
dc‘ : “ i dC
+ U2i  f  d tt ‘
dc‘




























































































From now on the notation is identical fro the EMU member countries 
and the ECB (i = 11 = ECB).
The policy multipliers (such as and ) are taken from the OEF
dC' dC'
model, the marginal utilities with respect to output and inflation i<; and u\ 
remain to be determined. The utility functions can be normalized by setting 
u[ = 1 for all i = 1, so that we are left with one equation for every unknown
u': . As output and inflation are targeted over a period of three years (see equation 
(2)), we have to assume a parametric specification af the utility function.
We specify the utility functions for the i EMU member countries as 
discounted sums of annual quadratic utilities5, with a fixed time discount factor,
<5 = 0.1:
( / ' = -  T  i ( l  +  <5)(l999~ ') U ( & V + 0 , ( * ; ) 2 i  '  =  1 I I  ( 7 )
r=1999 -
In matrix notation the utility can be written as
u '  = - - t ‘ r,t 't , »= i 11 (8)
where R, is a diagonal matrix containig the country specific parameters:
A, 0 0 0 0 0
0 (1 + S)-'ft, 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1 + (5)': /zl 0 0 0
0 0 0 0, 0 0
0 0 0 0 (1 +<*)->, 0
0 0 0 0 0 (1+ £)"<*,
5 Although, in fact we calculate utility over a three-years time horizon, we still are not dealing 
with a full-fledged interemporal optimization problem but with a quasi-static planning 
environment. In a intertemporal environment, the current target variables are functions, via 
rational expectations, of future policy variables. Then the logic of optimizing our utility 
function would be called into question, as Kydland-Prescott (1977) first explained. The time 
incosistency problem would arise when the private sector takes action dependent on 
anticipations of future policies. The OEF world model used in our exercise to calculate the 




























































































Now the parameters // and are determined by the normalizing 
condition and the first order condition in equation (6):




2001 ;»/-)’ 200 i
= - £  u + (l + 0,n[ r -1- = 0.
dC '
( 10)
( i i )
The results of the derivatives of the national utility functions at the Nash 
equilibrium ( , wl,), as well as the derived utility function parameters (//,, </>:) 
are presented in Table 4. A high value of //.signifies that the country has a 
priority for the output target in its utility function, which is the case for Belgium, 
Ireland and the Neatherlands. The inflation target is more important (indicated 
by high values of <p.) for Germany, Austria, Finland, Spain and of course for the 
ECB.
One has, however, to keep in minde that the parameters of the utility 
functions are dependent both on the baseline and the policy tradeoffs the 
countries are confronted with. And of course, the parameter are time-dependend. 
In our case we use the period 1999-2001. In an other period or business-cycle 
phase they could be different.
T able  4: Partial Derivatives of National Utility Functions at Nash Equilibrium 
( « , ,« , )  and Utility Function Parameters (//. ,ipl )
C ountry








Belgium B 1 -0.264 0.424 0.056
Germany D 1 -1.126 0.136 0.229
Spam E 1 -2.288 0.036 0.408
France F 1 -1.093 0.069 0.276
Ireland IRL 1 -2.474 0.181 0.264
Italy 1 1 -0.953 0.036 0.175
Netherlands NL 1 -1.032 0.358 0.184
Austna A 1 -1.739 0.140 0.375
Portugal P I -0.309 0.177 0.030
Finland FIN 1 -1.683 0.145 0.302
ECBa ECB 1 -0.687 0.074 0.137
ECB is the “ 11th EMU member country” . The respective parameters are derived from a 




























































































By setting n| = 1 we normalized the marginal utility of a GDP increase 
(relative to the baseline) sutained for three years to equal 1. So id measures the 
welfare cost, in GDP equivalents, of a one percentage point increase in inflation 
held for three years. A value of id = -2, for example, means that on the margin, 
policy makers are indifferent between a one percentage point rise in inflation 
and a sustained GDP loss of two percent relative to baseline. In the empirical 
analysis the values of id, for many countries is about 1. Small rises in inflation 
are equivalent to a one percent GDP loss for Belgium, Portugal and the ECB 
( « : < D .
Having these marginal weights, one can examine the scope for policy 
coordination. In a first step, we consider the effect on utility of country i of a 
rise in G in country j .  By assumption, the own-effects of policy actions are 
zero at the Nash equilibrium. Then we get the cross-country gains from fiscal 
and monetary expansion at the baseline (at Nash equilibrium). Formally, the 
utility of country i is influenced by policy action of country j  by:
~  = - T b,R, r7,, (12)
dC' "
where r,, is the block matrix of r  which contains the multipliers of country /"s 
targets with respect to country j  ‘s controls. The results are presented in Table 5. 





























































































T able  5: Cross-Country Gams from Fiscal and Monetary Expansion at Nash Equilibrium
CdU' I b C ' f
i -  rows 
j  = columns
B I) E F IRE 1
B 0 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.015
[ d 0.001 0 0.024 0.046 0.000 0.062
E 0.001 0.055 0 0.052 0.000 0.059
F 0.005 0.049 0.026 0 0.000 0.054
IRL -0.024 -0.100 -0.007 -0.059 0 -0.100
1 0.007 0.046 0.018 0.041 0.000 0
NL -0.007 -0.032 -0.010 -0.038 0.006 -0.073
A -0.005 0.072 0.024 0.042 0.000 0.045
P -0.012 -0.085 0.017 -0.051 0.005 -0.155
FIN -0.020 -0.049 0.002 -0.044 0.003 -0.043
ECBb -0.007 0.124 0.063 0.084 0.004 0.041
i = rows 
j  = columns
NL A P FIN ECB
B 0.0040 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.077
D 0.011 -0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.429
E 0.018 0.011 0.008 0.003 -0.502
F 0.018 0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.355
IRL -0.020 -0.008 0.002 -0.004 -0.100
I 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.252
NL 0 -0.003 0.001 -0.006 0.150
A 0.008 0 0.002 0.000 -0.432
P -0.008 -0.007 0 -0.005 0.431
FIN -0.004 -0.007 0.007 0 -0.124
ECB5 0.021 0.012 0.003 0.011 0
a The policy actions of the countries in the columns ( C 1, fiscal and monetary policies) have 
an impact on the utility of the countries in the rows ( t / ‘ ). Fiscal policy is independently 
executed by each of the 10 EMU countries. Monetary policy in the EMU is centrally executed 
by the ECB for the whole EMU area.
bThe utility of the ECB ( U tc“) is measured by a weighted utility function with GDP weights 




























































































3.3 Evaluation of the Cooperative Equilibrium
We remember that in the Nash equilibrium the maximization problem for 
country i was given by
where r, is the block matrix of r which contains the policy multipliers of 
country i ‘s targets with respect to policy actions of all countries and the ECB. 
By construction the optimal solution of the maximisation is given by
C' = (U....0) and 7" =(7'"1....r sas).
A cooperative equilibrium corresponds to the case where all the 
countries act jointly so as to maximize a collective utility function. This 
collective utility function is assumed to be a weighted average of each country’s 
own utility function.
The weights granted to each country in the cooperative process are
denoted by u ' , »:.... For the practical process of cooperation the question
arises which are the correct weights. Remembering the complicated framework 
of coordination described in chapter 2, one must conclude that the final level of 
coordination in EMU is the Council (the Ecofin). In the Council for a qualified 
majority the votes are weighted according to Article 205(2) TEC. That means 
the large countries have 10 votes, the medium-sized countries 5 votes and the 
small countries have votes from 2 to 4 votes. In total there are 87 votes. For 
most of the measures taken under the cooperation procedure a qualified majority 
is needed. That means the most plausible weighting scheme for a EMU-wide 
utility function is those according to the voting power of the EMU member 
countries in the Ecofin. Taking ECB as a large country an re-weighting on the 
basis of the 10 EMU member countries we get our weighting scheme for the 
EMU-wide utility function.
m a x ^  U ‘ (T1 )
s.t. T  = ( C ‘.....C ‘u,C fn ,)T + Tb‘
(13)
(14)




























































































Equation (15) can be expressed alternatively in matrix notation as:




/?r (tv'.tV'..... If") =
(16)
(17)
The cooperative equilibrium is thus the solution of the following optimisation 
problem:
m a x ( / r (tv',H,:......tv ") = 77?r ( v t t v ......tv" )Tr (18)
c 2
s.t. T = c r  + TB (19)
The solution to this problem (if there are no constraints or if they are not 
binding) can be derived analytically and is given by
Cc = - T BRc r T(VRc r T)~'
Tc  =CCr  + TB
And the welfare gain from cooperation (or coordination) is defined by
Uc - U N = ~ T c Rc Tcr  + ^ T bRcTbt . (22)
The argument for coordination can be demonstrated by a two-country 
example in a simple diagram (see Oudiz-Sachs, 1984, p. 27). In Figure 1 the 
indifference curves for countries 1 and 2 are drawn in ( C ' , C 2) space. It is 
assumed that dU'/dC2 and BU2ldC' are both positive. That means that the 
influence of the other country’s policy action exerts a positive impact on the 
home country. At the Nash equilibrium, N , C ' is chosen to maximize U' given 
C 2" ’, so that the indifference curve for 1 is horizontal at N  (that is, dU' IdC' = 0 ) ;  
similarly the indifference curve for 2 is vertical at N . Now, when C' is changed 
in the direction m(df/2/3C ), the domestic control is moved by the vector dC' 





























































































(actually, U' falls by a second-order term, while U : rises by a first-order temi). 
The vertical vector in the figure represents dC~. By the same argument, a small 
nse in C: leads to dU‘ >0 and dU1 = 0. A cooperative equilibrium would be 
given by a sum of vectors dC‘ and dC' . shown as the upward-sloping vector at 
point N . It clearly moves into a region of joint welfare improvement.
Figure 1: The G eom etry of Policy C oordination  in EM C
Two-country case: C ' = (fiscal) policy of country 1; C : = (fiscal) policy of country 2 .
U "  and f/,A are the indifference (utility) curves of country 1 and country 2 respectively.
£ l = equilibrium wiih unrestraint cooperation, £ 5t'p = equilibrium with cooperation under 
the constraint of the stability and growth pact (SGP).
Source: Oudiz-Saclis (1984, p. 27) with own adjustments.
The region between the two indifference curves f/* and u? describes the 
entire set of policy moves that are Pareto improving vis-a-vis N . In a non-EMU 




























































































the indifference curves of countries 1 and 2 are tangent. When no movement of 
C 1 and C : from E c can be Pareto improving. E ‘ is an efficient policy 
equilibrium. The equilibrium E c would be the optimal solution in a normal two- 
country world, where each country has full control over all policy instruments. 
However, in EMU -  as described in chapter 2 -  the framework is different. Even 
if point El might be the Pareto efficient coordination equilibrium, the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) with its limitations of the government budget deficit to 3 
percent of GDP as an upper limit and the medium term target of close to balance 
acts as a constraint for an unrestricted coordination equilibrium. Under the 
restrictive regime of the SGP the policy coordination outcome might result in an 
second-best equilibrium at point E SCP (see Figure 1). As our results show, this is 
exactly the case. The SGP is binding for an optimal policy coordination 
outcome. These arguments can easily be generalized to a n -  country world.
3.4 Gains from Cooperation
Based on the optimization procedure for cooperation described in the equations 
(19) and (20) we can calculate optimization gains for two scenarios, for (1) a 
“full cooperation” (all EMU countries coordinate their fiscal policy with the 
monetary policy of the ECB) and, (2) for a “partial cooperation” (where only the 
EMU countries coordinate their fiscal policy and the ECB stays aside). In both 
scenarios, firstly the unconstrained results are reported. Then restrictions to 
guarantee Pareto improvement are introduced and constraints by the SGP have 
to be taken into account. The numerical optimization are carried out with GAMS 
(General Algebraic Modeling System).
3.4,1 Gains from Full Fiscal and Monetary Policy Cooperation
Unconstrained cooperative equilibrium:
In a first step the cooperative equilibrium is calculated according to the 
optimization problem of the equations (18) and (19). This gives the 
unconstrained results for the optimal policy vector C c  of equation (20) (see 
Table 6) and hence the policy targets at cooperation T c  according to equation 




























































































Table 6: Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Cooperation and Welfare Gains from
Cooperation in EMU
O p tim a l U tility U tility W e lfa re
P o lic y A t N ash a t C o o p e ra tiv e . a g ain
E q u ilib riu m E q u ilib r iu m
CC UN UC (UC - 
UN)
/. Fiscal Policy
Belgium (B) 6,223 -0,707 -1,098 -0,391
Germany (D) 3,799 -3,045 -1,419 1,626
Spain (E) 5,913 -8,183 -5,964 2,219
France (F) 4,165 -3,661 -2,133 1,528
Ire land (IR L) 7,217 -5,475 -7,154 -1,679
Italy (1) 2,302 -6,288 -4,934 1,354
N etherlands (N L) 2,220 -1,724 -5,037 -3,313
A ustria (A) 6,258 -2,962 -1,295 1,667
Portugal (P) 4,437 -2,206 -5,777 -3,571
Finland (FIN) 5,360 -2,995 -3,814 -0,819
II. Monetary policy0
European Central Bank -3,549 -3,402 -2,156 1,246
(ECB) d
T O T A L
________________________ l
-3,985 -3,425 0,560
The unit of welfare gain is equivalent to a percentage change in GDP, averaged over three 
^ears (1999-2001).
The unit of fiscal policy is a sustained increase of government spending equal x percent of
GDP.
c
The unit of monetary policy is a sustained decrease of EM U’s short-term interest rate o f x
percent.
d
Welfare of the ECB is calculated from a welfare function with GDP weighted target 
variables: output and inflation, 
e
Weighted average of the national utility levels (weights according to council votes; ECB is a 
large country).




































































































-0 ,7 2 -1 ,0 8 -0 ,2 0 -0 ,9 7 , -1,83 -0 ,48
-2 ,6 3 -4 ,64 -1 ,6 0 -2 ,51 -1,26 -0 ,52
-1 1 ,2 2 -15,01 -8 ,6 4 -8 ,9 3 -5 ,62 -5 ,95
-4 ,2 9 -6 ,84 -4 ,0 6 -5 ,1 6 -3,80 -3 ,60
1,48 -0 ,9 0 -2 ,1 5 -2 ,4 3 -5,02 -2 ,92
-1 1 ,7 7 -1 2 ,8 9 -8 ,6 2 -9 ,9 2 -6 ,67 -6 ,82
1,51 -0 ,6 6 -1,46 -0 ,6 5 -4,74 -1 ,87
-1 ,6 3 -3 ,49 -1 ,21 -2 ,5 5 -2,34 -1 ,60 !
1,47 -0 ,09 -4,05 -2 ,6 9 -6,97 -3 ,78 !
-0 ,1 2 -2 ,28 -2 ,6 6 -2 ,6 6 -5,02 -2 ,65
-4 ,8 2 -6 ,88 -3 ,8 8 -4,71 -3,45 -2 ,88
3,76 1,31 0 ,1 2 1,89 -0 ,0 9 2 ,08
0 ,5 7 0 ,8 5 2 ,0 5 2 ,2 8 1,55 2 ,4 2
1,50 1,88 2 ,1 5 2 ,1 6 2 ,0 8 2 ,13
0 ,8 7 0 ,9 8 1,64 1,58 1,06 1,87
2 ,7 8 2 ,9 6 4,06 3 ,7 3 3,93 3 ,6 4
1,65 1,98 1,35 1,96 1,42 2 ,0 5
1,87 1,89 2,32 2,01 1,54 2 ,2 7
0 ,8 4 1,26 1,21 1,73 1,43 2 ,1 8
3,90 3 ,5 0 5,04 3 ,9 2 3 ,4 4 3 ,8 5
1,95 1,83 2,34 2 ,2 9 2,02 2,01
1,24 1 ,37 1,81 2 ,0 4 1,46 2 ,1 9
3 Target values are as follows: output gap, zero (full employment); inflation, zero. TC = target 
values at cooperative equilibrium; TB = target values at baseline (Nash equilibrium), 





























































































Table 8: Outcome of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Optimization with Cooperation:
Government Budget and GrossPublic Debt
1999 ( 2000 ] 2001














-2,80 0 ,8 4
-4,51 1,08
-2,74 0 ,3 5




-5,77 0 ,4 0
-2,33 2 ,9 9






55,80 5 4 ,92
4 ,2 9  5 ,4 0
5,93 3 ,1 3
1,08 -1 ,52






-4,76 5 ,2 4
-4,07 0 ,8 4
-0,40 1,85
-6,60 1,19
-8,28 0 ,1 8
-3,21 3 ,0 9
-3,49 1,23
61,99 5 2 ,2 4
9,75 4 ,9 6
16,78 8 ,4 2
8,92 4 ,3 4
-1,89 -1 5 ,6 9
56,02 5 1 ,2 7
5,88 4 ,1 2
12,45 2 ,2 5
8,66 -2 ,0 3










-10,87 0 ,0 0
-4,16 3 ,18
-4,21 1,41
68,67 4 8 ,2 7
14,83 4 ,5 6
20,85 6 ,44
12,35 3 ,04
2,78 -2 1 ,44
58,08 4 7 ,5 4
9,91 2 ,8 6
19,81 0 ,9 6
19,81 -2 ,3 7
0,71 -1 4 ,9 0
24,89 13 ,50
a
Target values are as follows: government budget balance to GDP ratio, -3 percent o f GDP 
Stability and Growth Pact upper limit); gross public debt to GDP ratio, 60 percent of GDP. A 
negative (positive) sign indicates that the budget deficit and/or the public debt target is 
violated (is below target) by x percent of GDP. TC = target values at cooperative equilibrium; 
TB = target values at baseline (Nash equilibrium), 
b





























































































Using the weighting according to the votes in the Council, total utility in 
the EMU at cooperative equilibrium is higher by 0.56% of GDP6 than in the 
case of the Nash equilibrium (or in the baseline; see Table 6). This implies an 
optimal fiscal policy7 impulse (increase of real public expenditures) in the EMU 
member states by 2 1/4 percent of GDP in the Netherlands and Italy to 7.2 
percent of GDP in Ireland. As an optimal monetary policy the ECB would have 
to decrease the short-term interest rate y 3.5 percentage points. Although in this 
unconstraint optimization solution total EMU utility would increase, in some 
EMU member states cooperation would lead to a welfare loss compared to the 
baseline situation (or non-cooperation). This is not an Pareto optimal solution 
for all EMU members.
Full economic policy cooperation would lead to an improvement in the 
targets (output and inflation) in most countries compared to the baseline solution 
in the three years (1999-2001) under examination (see Table 7).
The most unpleasant result concerns the fiscal targets of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), namely the budget deficits (upper bound of 3% of GDP) 
and the public debt to GDP ratio (60%). In practically all EMU member 
countries the full policy coordination scenario would lead to a violation of the 
SGP targets (see Table 8). Whereas in the baseline8 all EMU member states 
exhibit already a fiscal balance below the 3% of GDP deficit target of the SGP, 
after the massive fiscal impulse, as the optimization solution for cooperation 
would imply this target would be violated by all countries (except the 
Netherlands) not only at the end of the three year period but already in 1999.
Confronted with this violation of the vital EMU fiscal policy targets one 
has to question the room for manoeuvre for fiscal and monetary policy 
coordination in EMU. In the next step we look therefore for the degree of 
welfare gains from cooperation, given the constraints of a Pareto optimal 
solution concerning utilities for all EMU countries (they should all be positive) 
and the objective that the fiscal targets (budget deficits and public debt) are not 
violated.
6 As Oudiz-Sachs (1984, p. 64) have shown, small utility gains are equivalent to percent 
changes in GDP.
7 If one would choose equal weights w‘ in equation (19) instead of our choice of voting 
power in the Council the respective values for optimal policy would be lower. For fiscal 
policy between 0.9% of GDP in Italy to 3.6% in Ireland, and the monetary policy impuls 
would only be -1.8% .
8 A comparison of the baseline forecast of the OEF world model with the stability 
programmes submitted by the EMU member states under the SGP rules early in 1999 shows 





























































































Now, we take into consideration the two additional constraints for cooperation:
1. Pareto optimality constraint: All countries must improve their welfare 
or should at least not be worse off than in the non-cooperative situation 
(U° >US' ). Such a condition is necessary when bargaining for policy 
cooperation.
2. Stability’ and Growth Pact constraint: The SGP aims at a budgetary 
position of the EMU member states of close to balance or in surplus in the 
medium-run. An excess over this reference value is only allowed when it results 
from a severe economic downturn which is exceptional (i.e. when real GDP 
declines by at least 2% per annum). In our empirical analysis we only 
concentrate at the upper bound of the SGP budget deficit target of 3% of GDP 
which we use as an additional condition for the optimization procedure. The 
constraint on fiscal deficit is included in the form of a multiplier equation
_ B _ B
T <cr+T , where T is the government budget balance to GDP ratio deviation
from its target value (-3 percent of GDP) and T are the multipliers on 
government budget balance to GDP ratio. Baseline and multipliers are taken 
from the the OEF model in an analogous way to the values of r"and Tin 
equation (1).
These two constraints for calculating a cooperative equilibrium reduces 
the room for manoeuvre for an optimal fiscal and monetary policy dramatically 
(see Table 9). Total utility improves only slightly by 0.013% GDP. Only France 
and Austria can expect a small improve in their welfare from cooperation. The 
pattern of optimal fiscal policy varies from -0.4% in Germany to 2.3% in 
Ireland. The ECB would reduce short-term interest rates only by 0.3%. This 
implies that an optimal solution under the two constraints results in a fiscal 
policy pattern which allocates to some countries a fiscal expansion whereas 




























































































Table 9: Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Cooperation and Welfare Gains from
Cooperation in EMU (Utility and SGP constrained)
O p tim a l
P o lic y
CC
U tility  
a t N a s h  
E q u ilib riu m
UN
U tility
a t C o o p e ra tiv e  
E q u ilib r iu m
UC
W e lfa re
G a in 3
(UC -UN)
1. Fiscal Policy
Belgium (B) 0,297 -0,707 -0,707 0,000
Germany (D) -0,419 -3,045 -3,045 0,000
Spain (E) 1,235 -8,184 -8,184 0,000
France (F) -0,279 -3,661 -3,610 0,051
Ireland (IRL) 2,272 -5,475 -5,475 0,000
Italy (1) -0,180 -6,287 -6,287 0,000
Netherlands (NL) 0,272 -1,725 -1,725 0,000
Austria (A) 0,754 -2,962 -2,852 0,110
Portugal (P) -0,124 -2,206 -2,206 0,000
Finland (FIN) 0,926 -2,995 -2,995 0,000
II. Monetary policyc
European Central Bank -0,308 -3,402 -3,402 0,000
(ECB)d
Total - -3,985 -3,972 0,013
a
The unit of welfare gain is equivalent to a percentage change in GDP, averaged over three 
^ears( 1999-2001).
The unit of fiscal policy is a sustained increase of government spending equal x percent of 
GDP. 
c
The unit of monetary policy is a sustained decrease of EM U’s short-term interest rate of x 
percent, 
d .
Welfare of the ECB is calculated from a welfare function with GDP weighted target 
variables: output and inflation, e W eighted average of the national utility levels (weights 





























































































Table 10: Optimal Fiscal Policy with Cooperation and Welfare Gains from Cooperation in
EMU ______________________________________________________
Optimal Utility U tility Welfare
Policy At Nash at Cooperative gain3 
Equilibrium Equilibrium  
CC UN UC (UC - UN)
The unit of welfare gain is equivalent to a percentage change in GDP, averaged over three 
^ears (1999-2001).
The unit of fiscal policy is a sustained increase of government spending equal x percent of 
GDP. 
c
The unit of monetary policy is a sustained decrease of EM U’s short-term interest rate of x 
percent, 
d
Welfare of the ECB is calculated from a welfare function with GDP weighted target 
variables: output and inflation, 
e
Weighted average of the national utility levels (weights according to council votes; ECB is a 




























































































4.4.2 Gains from Partial, only Fiscal Policy Cooperation
In case of a fiscal cooperation only among the EMU member countries with an 
ECB not participating, the welfare gains would be only 0.02(T of GDP. The 
fiscal impulses would be below 1% of GDP (in Belgium the fiscal policy should 
even be restrictionist). Four out of 10 EMU countries would be worse off with 
cooperation compared to non-cooperation (see Table 10).
The advantage of this partial cooperation would be that the SGP targets 
would practically not be violated. Due to the small fiscal impulse the direct 
targets of optimization (output-gap and inflation) would only slightly be 
improved. If one introduces the additional constraints (Pareto optimality 
concerning welfare in each country; SGP targets) the cooperative welfare gains 
would be practically nil.
In both cases, a constrained cooperative solution (results in Table 9) and a 
partial cooperation scenario (results in Table 10) lead to a situation which leads 
the EMU countries back to the baseline or Nash equilibrium (as demonstrated in 
Figure 1). Only full cooperation leads to massive welfare gains, however, it 
violates some basic targets (each country gains and the SGP objectives are 
binding).
CONCLUSIONS
With a large-scale econometric world model we calculate the multipliers for 
fiscal and monetary policy for 10 EMU countries and the ECB. Fiscal policy is 
in the responsibility of the EMU member countries, monetary policy is 
conducted centrally by the ECB for Euroland. Then in a Tinbergen-like 
approach we link targets to policy instruments. In order to evaluate the gains 
from cooperation we compare a cooperative equilibrium with the non- 
cooperative one (by definition the baseline scenario is called the Nash 
equilibrium). The cooperative equilibrium is the result of the maximization of a 
weighted utility function with derived parameters for the targets output gap and 
inflation. In the case of a “full” cooperation, where the 10 EMU countries 
coordinate their fiscal policy with the monetary policy of the ECB the welfare 
gains obtained are very large for Euroland as a whole. However the strong fiscal 
and monetary policy impulses as a result of this optimization procedure lead, 
firstly to a violation of the fiscal targets (budget deficit, public debt) of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which limits the room for manoeuvre of fiscal 
policy of the EMU member states in stage III of EMU. Secondly, we find that 
not in all countries cooperation leads to welfare gains, a result which is not 




























































































optimality and SGP objectives) the constrained optimization leads to a solution 
in case of “full” cooperation which drives most countries back to the Nash 
position at the baseline. In addition, a “partial” cooperation in which the ECB 
stays aside and only the fiscal policies of the EMU member countries are active, 
leads to a very small welfare improvement and violates again (only to minor 
degree the Pareto optimality condition). The optimal fiscal policy impulses are 
very modest.
The policy implications are twofold: First, our results indicate that -  
taking realistic data over the next three years -  the SGP might have a very 
strong limiting impact on the efforts for a positive or active cooperation in EMU 
which would lead to more output and employment. Second, the EMU consists of 
still not fully harmonized economies with different reactions to policy shocks. 
That means the present EMU still does not present an optimum currency area. It 
may well be, however, that in the medium-run the single currency leads to a 
stronger real convergence (convergence of the business cycle and to a 
comparable impact of similar policy shocks).
Fritz BREUSS 
University of Economics and 
Business Administration,
Vienna & Austrian Institute of 
Economic Research (WIFO), Vienna
Andrea WEBER
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